Dr. Thupten Jinpa

Metaethics

Determinism & the Problem of Free Will

The conventional notion of free will is that it means we can make choices in our lives and that these choices are up to us. For instance, nothing stops one from choosing a career in medicine or business. However, this becomes problematic when one’s precedent actions and experiences play a role in making these choices, disregarding his or her cognizance. The question that how much does our past has influence over the future or how strong is the connection between past and future is where this philosophical problem of free will arises. Philosophers attempt to explain how the past is connected to the future and what impact this connection has on our ability to make free choices.
Determinists posit that our future events are fixed by the past events. But it allows the fact that even if our future is determined by the past, we are not compelled to perform particular actions. In a deterministic world, we still make choices, it is only that our choices are determined by the particular past experiences. The German philosopher, Schopenhauer puts it succinctly, I quote: “We do not lose our sense of free will even if our actions are determined by the past. Some of the things we can do in the future might be ruled out by events in our past”. However, the hard-determinists postulate that believing in free will is a childish illusion by arguing for the law of causality. The past causes the future and this causal link determines what future looks like. By employing a philosophical principle, i.e. principle of sufficient reason, they claim that anything that happens does so for a definite reason. Their argument presents:

Kane’s Libertarianism

Kane argues that “(1) the existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent’s power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely, and that (2) determinism is not compatible with alternative possibilities (it precludes the power to do otherwise)”
However, It is important to note that the crux of Kane’s position is grounded not in a defense of alternative possibilities (AP) but in the notion of what Kane refers to as ultimate responsibility (UR). Thus, AP is a necessary but insufficient criterion for free will.
Ultimate responsibility entails that agents must be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends and purposes. There must be more than one way for a person’s life to turn out (AP). More importantly, whichever way it turns out must be based in the person’s willing actions. As Kane defines it, In short, “an agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient reason (condition, cause or motive) for the action’s occurring.”